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Introduction
In the late 1960s, psychiatry and society were riven by the convulsion of antipsychiatry (Healy 2002a) . Students stormed universities and occupied departments of psychiatry, claiming that mental illness did not exist, and that the treatments being used for mental illness were simply chemical straight jackets.
By 1980, the antipsychiatric argument that mental illness does not exist had apparently begun to lose its appeal. The advent of the third Diagnostic & Statistical Manual, which gave psychiatry operational criteria for diagnoses, and the rise of neuroscience almost certainly played a part in reassuring many that the treatment of nervous problems had moved into less ideological and less contested waters. PET scans and other techniques appeared to attest to the reality of mental illness rather than just the existence of brains.
But aside from the existence or non-existence of mental illness, there had been a broader thrust to the antipsychiatric argument, which was that the vaunted deinstitutionalisation of psychiatry had unrecognised consequences for all of us and not just for the relatively small group of individuals at risk of being incarcerated in asylums (Healy 2002a) . With the availability of new drugs and the prescription only status of these drugs, the nervousness that can be found in the community at rates of 10-20% -viewed by some as being of social origin, by others as being of psychological origin and by yet others as being of biological origin -had fallen into the clutches of psychiatry. Real questions could be asked about how adequately psychiatrists had been trained to handle the many issues surrounding the experience of everyday nerves or about how psychiatry as a process was equipped to handle the management of some of our most intimate experiences.
It is this domain of influences on the experience of everyday nerves that this article seeks to address. It will suggest that there can be little confidence that the alienists, who had been decanted from their asylums in the 1950s and 1960s, are in control of or understand the forces shaping this domain.
aware of interest in this new disorder. This led to programmes and articles featuring panic attacks. Even though many of these programmes and articles recommended behaviour therapy as the appropriate treatment rather than drug treatment, the net result of media exposure was that the way patients understood and expressed their experiences changed and the way physicians viewed those experiences also changed. This was true even in Britain, where Xanax never became widely available. Pharmaceutical funding strategically placed in academia had leveraged a much wider change in consciousness in society generally.
There is more than a simple change of labels for personal experiences involved here. The term panic in the late 1980s connoted a disturbance of biology, where anxiety neurosis had indicated a psychosocial problem best managed by nondrug means. (A further implication of these changing labels will be outlined below in the marketing of depression). Quite aside from the true nature of the problems and their most appropriate treatment, this example of pharmaceutical company marketing gives evidence of a new force at work with capacities to transform some of our most intimate experiences and there is nothing in the training of psychiatrists that would lead anyone to think they were likely to be aware of what was happening. A few more examples will help indicate the scope of this issue.
In the early 1990s, Roche had hoped to market moclobemide for the treatment of another of this new cluster of disorders -social phobia. In preparation for the launch of moclobemide, Roche commissioned an educational booklet produced apparently disinterestedly by a working party of the World Psychiatric Association, aimed at helping clinicians to recognise the features of social phobia. One hundred thousand copies of this were prepared for distribution to clinicians. Moclobemide was eventually only licensed in a small number of markets for social phobia, but the methods of marketing it, which involved selling social phobia have been documented in some detail (Moynihan 2001) , and have 3 Bury M Gabe J (1990) . Hooked? Media Responses to Tranquilliser Dependence. In Abbott P, Payne G (Eds.) New Direction in the Sociology of Heath. Basingstoke, Falmer, Brass, 87-103. Gabe J, Bury M (1991) . Tranquillisers and Health Care in Crisis. Social Science and Medicine 32, 449-454. Bury M (1996) . Caveat Venditor: social dimensions of a medical controversy. in Healy D, Doogan D, Psychotropic Drug Development:social economic and pharmacological aspects, Chapman & Hall, London. 7 subsequently been pursued on a much wider scale by Smithkline, the marketers of paroxetine (Paxil), when it was licensed for social phobia. Since then a literature has burgeoned, and even though much of this recommends non-drug treatments for "shyness", sales for Paxil increase in line with awareness of both shyness and social phobia among physicians and consumers.
What can be seen here is a pattern of marketing diseases that can also be seen in the rest of medicine in the marketing of problems such as osteoporosis, leading to hormone replacement therapy or calcium enhancing drugs (Berman 1999), elevated lipid levels, leading to the use of lipid lowering drugs, erectile dysfunction leading to the use of sildenafil; or bipolar disorder by a range of different companies, leading to the use of so-called "mood-stabilizers".
Within the domain of everyday nerves, these unfolding events were shaped by an earlier set of developments. In the mid-1980s, the benzodiazepine group of tranquilliser drugs, of which Valium, Librium, and Ativan were among the best known, were linked with the production of physical dependence. Concerns about benzodiazepines dependence rapidly escalated into a crisis that helped establish health as both an item of news and an object of study within the social sciences 3 .
In the late 1980s, the first of the new drugs acting on the serotonin system, buspirone, was marketed as a non-dependence producing tranquilliser. This failed in the market-place, even though its mechanisms of action and treatment effect sizes for both anxiety and depression are similar to the mechanisms of action and treatment effect sizes of SSRIs and other serotonergic drugs for either anxiety or depression. This development made it clear that the new generation of serotonergic drugs coming on stream would have to be developed as antidepressants rather than tranquillisers. The idea of a non-dependence producing tranquilliser had no credibility in the market place, whereas a ntidepressants were not thought to be dependence-producing. The SSRIs became antidepressants, and it was predictable even then that companies would seek to branch out from the beachhead of depression into the hinterlands of anxiety (Healy 1991) .
Although it is now well-recognized that nervous disorders are shaped by history (e.g. Hacking 1995) there have been few commentators within either the social sciences or mental health fields who have been prepared to contemplate the possibility that the Era of Depression we have recently been living through in the West has stemmed primarily from the need of pharmaceutical companies to market compounds such as Prozac, Zoloft and Paxil.
In the West, cases that would have been treated by Valium and Ativan were being converted into cases to be treated by Prozac and Zoloft and Paxil. This situation is reflected in data on pharmaceutical sales, which show clearly that sales of antidepressants soared in the UK and the USA through the 1990s while sales of tranquillisers flattened and dropped so that by the middle of the 1990s the sales of the antidepressants had overtaken those of the tranquillisers (Rose 2003) . The overall volume of sales of drug treatments for nervousness remains however approximately constant, which indicates that what is involved at least in part is not a detection of new cases of depression but a transformation of cases of anxiety into cases of depression.
This switch did not happen in Japan, where benzodiazepine dependence had never become a crisis. The Japanese pharmaceutical market is a high volume market with many features in common with Western pharmaceutical markets. In both Japan and the West, the antidepressant market had been a much smaller one than the tranquilliser market through the 1980s. For every person put on an antidepressant, three or four were put on tranquillisers. In Japan, this distribution of sales continued: the market for tranquillisers remained robust through the 1990s, while sales of antidepressants remained what they had been during the 1980s. There were no SSRIs on the Japanese market until 1999, when fluvoxamine was licensed for the combination of OCD and depression. In 2000, Paxil was licensed for the combination of social phobia and depression. As of 2003, Prozac is still not on the Japanese market. Far from being anomalous, the Japanese were closer to the global norm. It was the UK and US that proved the exception. Figures from South America and elsewhere during this period show comparable trends to those found in Japan (Rose 2003) .
The move from anxiety to depression can be seen in a different form in advertisements for antidepressants and tranquillisers during the period. The images of nervous problems from the 1960s through to the late 1980s showed young to middle-aged women, in good health after treatment with tranquillisers.
In contrast, the image of depression during this period was of older women, and occasionally older men. Depression was a relatively rare disorder of middle-aged or older people. In the 1990s, the women featured in advertisements for SSRI antidepressants, such as those for Lilly's Prozac, Solvay's Luvox and Glaxo SmithKline's Paxil become progressively younger; by the late 1990s these women appear to be in their mid-20s.
By the mid-1990s, patients presenting with nervous problems typically talked about problems with their mood. When asked how long these problems might last, it was common to have patients say the problem might last for half an hour to several hours. This by definition is not a classical mood disorder, which involves a pervasive and persistent abnormality of mood, a dysthymia, lasting typically for several months, but at the very least for several weeks 4 .
Whether these conditions are appropriately called mood or anxiety disorders is immaterial. The problem that patients experienced as anxiety in the mid-1970s or early 1980s was transmuted first of all into panic attacks, and is now more likely to be called a mood disorder. Where aspects of the experience tied into physiological changes may remain constant, and may differ between anxiety and depression, it seems likely that a diagnosis of depression will demoralise where a diagnosis of anxiety will lead to anxiety about being anxious. In so far as this happens, these changes of label seem capable of affecting significant parts of the overall experience that is anxiety or depression There are further aspects to this. Even though drugs were used in its treatment, as mentioned anxiety up through to the 1980s had been seen primarily as a psychological problem, and a slew of psychodynamic terms linked to its psychological management had penetrated into popular language. Terms such as defence mechanisms, libido and ego were bandied around, commonly divorced from their theoretical frames of reference. This psychobabble had consequences for notions of legal and moral responsibility, as well as for child rearing and educational practices. By 1997, however, the front page of the G2 section of the Guardian, one of Britain's leading liberal broadsheets, featured the image of a depressive thinker agonising over the fact that Britain had become so depressed. On the inside the author wonders whether the British have become a low serotonin people (James 1997). The psychobabble is rapidly being replaced by a biobabble that equally has pervasive consequences for the ways we view and experience ourselves and not just for the labels we give to our discontents.
By 1996, the World Health Organisation had reported that depression was the second greatest source of disability on the planet (Murray and Lopez 1996) . The response from psychiatry to this news appeared to be satisfaction that the discipline was now the second most important in medicine after cardiology.
Nobody seemed to question how a society could have become so depressed so fast. Depression was being touted as a serious illness; but the emergence of a comparable epidemic of any other serious illness on this scale would have led to serious questioning as to what had happened. There appeared to be no such questioning in the case of depression.
Despite the element of scepticism here, it should be noted that many regard this switch from diagnosing anxiety to diagnosing depression as evidence of scientific progress rather than one more instance of disease marketing. The recent rebranding of SSRIs as anxiolytics, which is outlined below, has however considerably strengthened the sceptical position.
Marketing Disorders
A more sceptical position also depends on being able to explain how pharmaceutical companies achieve such transformations. With colleagues, I
recently tracked reviews of antidepressants used to treat depression in people with physical illnesses. This aspect of the literature on depression essentially only appears during the mid-1980s, even though the antidepressants had been available since the late 1950s. Similarly, when tracking articles on depression from periodicals such as Vogue, one can again see a literature appearing on depression and antidepressants in the mid-1980s (Shorter 1999 ).
The most parsimonious explanation of the emergence of this literature on depression and antidepressants in the mid to late 1980s is that governments, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, physicians and the public at large, all want good news about treatments, whether drug or non-drug treatments. By the mid1980s it had become impossible to write good news stories about the benzodiazepines. The benzodiazepines had been the big trees in the nervous disorder jungle, and felling these provided previously shaded plants with new opportunities to grow. The literature on the antidepressants blossoms from that point, even though drugs to treat depression had been available from the late 1950s. It would appear that this holds as true for the academic as for the lay media.
When a new literature emerges like this -for whatever reason -the coincidence of its claims with those of interested parties can significantly affect the rate of growth of the literature. In the case of psychotropic drugs, pharmaceutical companies provide an extremely efficient distribution system for scientific articles that suit their marketing interests. For example, I have in the past had enquiries from companies about the price of 5,000, 10,000 and 20,000 reprints of an article that I had written that happens to mention a particular drug; for non-commercially based research that doesn't feature a product, it would be very unusual to get more than 200-300 reprint requests.
In addition to supporting and distributing a literature, which companies have been doing since the 1950s, there are a number of other well-known factors that pharmaceutical companies can use to promote a change in cultures, some of which have operated for decades and others are more recent. From the 1950s, celebrity endorsement in advertisements and articles in the lay media have played an important role in the marketing of drugs. But more recently, a different form of celebrity endorsement and advertisement in the academic media has played an increasing role: pharmaceutical companies have commissioned rather than simply distributed scientific articles, as will be outlined below.
Another recent feature of the marketplace is the development of patient groups.
Patient groups became part of the market development plans for new agents in the 1990s, as companies realised that patients can often lobby more effectively for a new high cost treatment than anyone else can. In the mid-1990s, it was common to find meetings costing approximately $1000 per day to attend, at which representatives from the major pharmaceutical companies offered lessons on how to set up patient groups. As the brochure for one such meeting put it:
"Carefully planned patient education campaigns are .. becoming more widespread as pharmaceutical companies realise the benefits of added value services. At this two-day conference, you will discover how to successfully create targeted patient education campaigns which will establish your expertise in argued that it was appropriate to restrict Prozac to treating proper clinical depression while two argued that if Prozac helped people who might not appear to be classically depressed but rather might seem to be alienated that this was a legitimate use of the drug. The fifth article outlined the story covered here that we have moved from an age of anxiety to an era of depression and we may move back in the near future. The interest in the Prozac story, accordingly, it was argued, lies in the abilities of pharmaceutical companies to manipulate consciousness, that a key feature in what happens is market share, and that in the interest of market share certain aspects of the data were not entering the public domain in a manner that would be appropriate for science. In response to this article, Eli Lilly who, at the time as I understood it, were the biggest single funders of the Hastings Centre withdrew their funding (Healy 2002b ).
In April 2000, a book Prozac Backlash appeared (Glenmullen 2000) . A series of reviews apparently authored by a number of senior figures in US psychiatryRothschild, Dunner, Greist, Ruben, and Emslie were sent to a number of media outlets shortly afterwards. These reviews have a consistent theme, which date back to Lilly's first defence of Prozac in 1990 against charges that it might provoke suicide in some patients, namely that Prozac is one of the most researched drugs in history and that the problems stem from the disease depression and not its treatment with Prozac. The supposed real tragedy of books like Prozac Backlash is that patients who are at risk of committing suicide will be scared away from effective treatment and as a result will end up committing suicide. These reviews went to Jamie Talan of Newsday in New York with a covering letter from Robert Schwadron of Chamberlain Communications, a PR agency working for Lilly in New York. In his covering letter, Schwadron offers to arrange for interviews on this book with members of Eli Lilly as well as with "independent researchers from the medical community".
The Chamberlain logo features a target. It will come as no surprise therefore to find that Chamberlain had listed Dr Glenmullen as someone to manage.
Chamberlain also appears to have targeted me. The views I have expressed in recent years are entirely consistent with views expressed in The Antidepressant Era (Healy 1998) , which were reviewed favourably by clinicians as well as investigators and others working with the pharmaceutical industry. Yet a few years later the same views were being described as controversial. I was receiving phone calls from Canada, the United States, Japan and elsewhere to tell me that I was being described as trouble and was soon to be in trouble by US psychiatrists, who neither knew me nor had heard me talk. It remains a moot 
Authoring Articles
A 1999 email said: "Dear David I am delighted you are able to participate in our satellite symposium… In order to reduce your workload to a minimum we have had our ghost-writers produce a first draft based on your published work. I attach it here…" The attached article was a recognisably Healy piece, complete with Healy references saying the kinds of things that I often say. Many people who think they know my work would probably be hard pushed to pick it out as a fake.
However, I had already mapped out what it was I wanted to write, and I sent a draft article back to the company running the symposium. They were happy with the contents but made it clear that there were some commercially important points in the previous manuscript, and that they would arrange for someone else to author this. The article I authored finally appeared in a journal supplement (Healy 1999) Rather than reject this draft, as an experiment, I edited it in two ways. One was to point to the fact that clinical trial data from mirtazapine, a product directly competing with Wyeth's venlafaxine, appeared to give a message that was very different to the message that Wyeth were hoping to put across. The second alteration was to point out that there was considerable evidence from clinical trial and healthy volunteer populations that personality types may in fact predict suitability to selective agents such as the SSRIs. The same can be expected to 7 All copies including the published article in the J Psychiatry & Neuroscience available from the author. 8 As Spilker of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America put it when the issue was raised in the Washington Post, "Academic researchers participating in studies 'are given every opportunity to review, make suggestions and sign off on manuscripts [and] 
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hold true for venlafaxine, in which case if patients are not suited to venlafaxine it might in fact make them suicidal (see Table 1 ).
Despite having been told that I was free to edit the original article in whatever way I chose, by return of e-mail there was an objection to the mention of mirtazapine. I did not attend the Laguna Beach meeting. The next time I saw this article was when it had already been sent to the journal, which was going to publish the proceedings of the symposium. The final article had been revised extensively. The reference to the fact that failing to match venlafaxine to patient could lead to problems including suicidality was missing. A new ending stated the current best treatment was with venlafaxine. I objected and removed my name from the article 7 . This chain of events gives the lie to pharmaceutical company justifications of ghostwriting of this type, which is that the notional authors of these articles check them closely and sign off on them 8 .
Authoring Articles: Current Medical Directions
Since the 1980s a majority of major pharmaceutical companies have outsourced their medical writing to medical writing agencies (Healy 2003c) . Companies also began setting up satellite symposia in conjunction with formerly scientific meetings. Journals began to publish the proceedings of such satellite symposia in supplements. As this happened concerns grew about the prevalence of ghostwriting of medical articles such as that outlined above. Until quite recently the assumption has been that ghostwriting has been confined to review articles, appearing primarily in journal supplements or in obscure journals.
The idea that medical writing agencies would restrict themselves to the margins of therapeutics does not tally with the mission statement for Current Medical Directions (CMD), a medical information company set-up in New York in 1990, "to deliver scientifically accurate information strategically developed for specific target audiences" (www.cmdconnect.com). This agency writes up studies, review articles, abstracts, journal supplements, product monographs, expert commentaries and textbook chapters. It conducts meta-analyses, and organizes journal supplements, satellite symposia, and consensus conferences, and even constitutes advisory boards for its clients. In all this the company "strives to exceed the expectations of our clients and to assist them in achieving their strategic objectives".
As of 1998, CMD was coordinating articles on Zoloft (sertraline) for Pfizer. As part of a legal action against Pfizer, I was given a document on a non-confidential basis that laid out a series of articles being coordinated by CMD. This document lists the progress of articles on Zoloft as of the start of 1999. It details a total of 85 articles being worked on, of which 55 had appeared by early 2001. As might be expected, the CMD articles exclusively cover areas of marketing concern for Pfizer. They are clinical trials or reviews on clinical conditions for which Pfizer had a marketing license for Zoloft or in which they were seeking one.
PTSD was one of the conditions for which Pfizer was seeking a license. In the case of the set of articles on PTSD, the document appears to indicate that the first draft of two articles on PTSD had already prepared, even though the authors' names were listed "TBD" (to be determined) (CMD 1999) Whatever the actual authorship of these articles, the CMD document defines a set of articles, and it is possible to compare CMD articles on Zoloft with non-CMD articles on Zoloft from the same period. We have done so by comparing CMD and non-CMD articles systematically in three areas (Healy and Cattell 2003) . An analysis of this document appears to establish that ghostwriting is no longer something happening only in peripheral journals, affecting only review articles. It happens in the most prestigious journals in therapeutics, and it probably happens preferentially for papers reporting randomised trials and other data-driven papers. 
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An analysis of the published CMD articles reveals some other important points.
There are significant discrepancies between at least some of the CMD set of articles and the raw data underlying these articles. For instance, the CMD set of articles contains six articles in which Zoloft has been given in trials to children with obsessive-compulsive disorder or depression. One of these articles published in JAMA mentions one child becoming suicidal. The other five articles make no mention of suicidality as a potential hazard of Zoloft given to children.
One of these five articles in fact states that the authors are reporting on the sideeffects that had occurred at a 10% rate or more (Alderman et al 1998) .
However it is clear from internal company documents 10 that of the 44 children who were depressed and went on Zoloft in this series of trials 4, or 9%, made suicidal acts.
In another article, published in the British Medical Journal, Malt et al (1999) report on a study in which sertraline is compared to mianserin and placebo. Early drafts of the article mention that there is one suicide and three suicide attempts on sertraline, one suicide attempt on mianserin and no suicide attempts of any sort on placebo. The final version does not mention any of these adverse effects.
In summary, based on a published analysis of the CMD document, the following points can be made. First, up to 75% of the articles on randomised controlled trials on therapeutic agents appearing in major journals may now be ghostwritten.
Second, in terms of citation rates, the most cited articles in therapeutics are now likely to be ghost-written. Third, the new methods of authorship appear to lead to an omission of negative data on the hazards of therapeutic agents.
Influence has always played a part in science. As Thomas Kuhn (1962) argued, dominant scientific paradigms often act to silence the dissent of critics rather than to stimulate critical thinking. But Kuhn never envisaged the possibility of a dominant paradigm emerging because a writing agency produced an apparent consensus, by sprinkling a set of authoritative names on a group of articles.
Medicalisation and the Marketing of Data
In response to media concerns about their free meals in the Waldorf and educational meetings in the Caribbean, clinicians say these 'freebies' do not campaigns. These were supported by money from pharmaceutical companies.
The campaigns were extremely successful, and, as argued above, helped convert cases of Valium and Ativan to cases of Prozac and Paxil and Zoloft. A great part of the rhetoric of these campaigns stressed that the recognition of 11 Data for suicides and suicidal acts for antipsychotics can be accessed from medical reviews posted on the FDA website -www.fda.gov/cder/approval/index.htm. My scrutiny of the records confirms that the data does not appear to be with the FDA. Requests to the company for the missing data have been rebuffed. Requests to the relevant departments of government in the UK have gone unanswered. 24 depression was extremely important so that this condition, which carried a high risk of suicide, could be treated effectively. Recognition and treatment would contribute to lowering national suicide rates.
Unbeknownst to the proponents of such campaigns, even if the detection of depression had been restricted to the classical cases of severe depression, who are at risk of suicide, the central claim of these campaigns, namely that the detection of depression would lower suicide rates, was deeply problematic. Just as these campaigns began, data for suicides and suicidal acts from clinical trials of SSRI agents lodged with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA demonstrated that SSRIs could not in principle lower suicide rates -see Table 1 .
As of the early 1990s, the complete datasets lodged with the FDA, rather than the selected datasets commonly cited by pharmaceutical companies, revealed that there was a statistically significantly increased risk of both suicides and suicidal acts on these drugs (Healy 2003) . Furthermore, it is now clear that the data lodged with the regulators is misleading on this very important issue . For example, the data on suicides and suicidal acts recorded under placebo in trials of Paxil indicate 2 suicides and 6 suicidal acts, when the true figure may in fact be as low as 1 suicidal act on placebo. The remainder of the suicidal acts occurred during the run-in phase of trials or sometimes in the case of SSRI trials, up to a year after the trial had ended. This pattern of data management appears common to most SSRI companies.
Other manoeuvres include it would seem outright suppression of data. Consider the data on suicidal acts with recently licensed antipsychotics lodged with the FDA -see Table 2 . It would appear from a published article (Khan et al 2001) that there are no data on non-lethal suicidal acts on olanzapine lodged with the . This is clearly not trivial as the data on suicides for olanzapine suggest it has the highest rate of suicides in psychotropic trial history. The fact that these data are missing has been in the public domain since September 2001. During this time there has been no complaint from any scientific group and olanzapine has become the best-selling antipsychotic in North America and Western Europe.
It would seem that he who controls the means of data production controls consciousness.
Aspects of the Sociology of Clinical Trials
The developments outlined here point to three issues in need of a detailed social analysis. First there is the centrality now accorded clinical trials within the medical marketplace. Second is the emphasis on marketing compounds by selling diseases and the risks associated with diseases. Third is the role of social institutions such as the regulatory apparatus and institutional review boards in containing problems that the drug development makes almost inevitable.
On the first issue, it is now commonly thought that clinical trials prove that treatments work. Philosophically, however, clinical trials are set up on the basis of a null hypothesis -namely that a putative treatment in fact does not differ from placebo. They were designed to stop therapeutic bandwagons. If the treatment appears to differ from placebo in these short terms trials (6-8 weeks) undertaken in conditions that may last months, years, or decades, all that can be said is that the treatment does something, and there is a basis for further research. This is not the same as saying that treatments work. To establish this would require studies that demonstrated long-term benefits and also controlled for hazards such as physical dependence that appeared on discontinuation. Within psychiatry, the current evidence-based medicine bandwagon is as hegemonic as the Freudian paradigm ever was. The results from trials are incorporated into algorithms and protocols, which increasingly define a supposedly rational medicine. Critics of the system are not entertained if they offer sociological or qualitative analyses. Evidence-based medicine sees itself as building a value-free, timeless, ahistorical science. One of the current challenges facing the history and sociology of modern medicine is to outline the origins of and maintaining factors for this belief system. This is particularly important, as there is good evidence that treatment outcomes within mental health are deteriorating. While the absolute numbers of patients occupying beds in asylums through to the 1950s began to fall thereafter, the numbers of both voluntary and involuntary admissions per annum has been rising steadily since then in both Europe and North America. We have been able to quantify this increase in a study recently undertaken in North Wales, which systematically compared mental health service utilization over 100 years in a unique service delivery system that owing to population, financial and geographical constraints allows such comparisons to be made in a manner that should hold for services in both Europe and North America. In line with other data, this study demonstrated that we now compulsorily detain three times more patients than were detained before modern psychotropic drugs were first developed, that we admit fifteen times more patients than were admitted before the present psychotropic era began, and patients now on average spend more time in the course of a psychiatric career in a hospital than they did before modern drugs came on stream . In part this situation has arisen, because as mentioned in the introduction psychiatry also manages community nervousness in a way that was not the case until the 1950s. Based on these findings, there would seem to be a major disjunction between the results of short-term clinical trials and the longer-term effects of using treatments endorsed by such trials.
The second issue concerns the centrality of risk to modern marketing. Risk has The second meaning of the notion of a lifestyle drug marries reliability and risk.
The best-selling drugs in the marketplace have for the past 20 years been drugs that act on risk factors for diseases, such as elevated blood pressure or elevated lipid levels, rather than on core diseases -strokes or heart attacks. There is a twofold appeal to pharmaceutical companies in treating risk factors. It is much easier to alter a risk factor reliably, such as elevated blood pressure or lipid levels, than it is to affect a disease process. Focussing on risk factors allows the development of products that meet industrial criteria for quality. For instance, antihypertensives reliably lower blood pressure. These quality products, however, may have little impact on the wider state of the health of the population.
In addition to providing a basis for developing quality products, populations carrying risk factors offer much larger markets than populations with diseases. If 1 per 100 has a disease but 10 per 100 carry a risk factor, conventional medical models will mandate the treatment of the 1 diseased individual, whereas the new emphasis on risk mandates the treatment of 10. Risk thresholds furthermore can be ratcheted down progressively, creating ever-larger markets. people to be treated with antihypertensives to save one life would influence many of us, when it comes to contemplating whether to take a drug that might wipe out our sex life or otherwise significantly impair our quality of life. The marketing of risk in the past decade, however, has made it difficult to persuade physicians that not treating a mild hypertension is completely different to not treating a fulminant pneumonia, and not intervening with a drug treatment for a person who could be conceived as being theoretically at risk of suicide is quite different to not intervening in the case of someone who has actually tried to commit suicide.
The third issue concerns the social institutions put in place to manage pharmaceutical companies. When faced with potential hazards like drug-induced suicidality, clinicians and consumers assume that if clinical trials with these drugs have been "through the FDA", there cannot be anything fundamentally wrong.
Regulatory bodies however essentially have only minimal audit functions. It is pharmaceutical companies that decide which trials should be conducted. And trials are conducted to fit the marketing requirements of the company, rather than being dictated by the effects of the drug. For example SSRIs have greater effects on premature ejaculation than on depression. The decision to market these drugs as antidepressants is a business rather than a scientific decision.
Where once clinical trials were undertaken by independent universities, they are now conducted in settings and by notional investigators that suit pharmaceutical company interests (Healy 2002a . These CROs in addition now provide a privatized IRB system that grants ethical approval to company studies (Lemmens and Freedman 2000) . The articles that stem from the data collected, tabulated and analyzed by CROs are then written up by medical communications agencies working for pharmaceutical companies with some of the consequences outlined above.
There is therefore a rapidly shrinking degree of oversight of the drug development process. In this situation, compared with financial auditors the one weapon the FDA has to prevent a pharmacological Enron happening is the fact that drugs are made available on prescription only. But where in the 1960s it might have been reasonable to think that many physicians, other perhaps that the recently de-institutionalised alienists, would have had the clout and inclination to grapple with the industry, this is not now the case. Clinicians are busy celebrating their adherence to the evidence provided by the marketing departments of pharmaceutical companies. None more so than psychiatrists.
The creation of medical paradigms creates demand for drugs. In creating demand, pharmaceutical companies may simply be exemplary modern corporations. J K Galbraith (1967) argues that in the latter half of the 20 th century, corporations have downgraded efforts to make products to suit our needs, and are much more likely to aim at creating needs to suit the portfolio of products they have. In Bruno Latour's (1986) terms, it is more profitable to translate interests and then satisfy them than to satisfy pre-existing interests. Arguably, the availability of drugs on a prescription only basis makes this creation of needs particularly simple in medicine, as so few hearts and minds need to be won. 
Back to the Future
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The second commercially important message is to "talk to your doctor about non habit forming Paxil today". The other way that this is expressed is that anxiety can be treated with a benzodiazepine or with Paxil/Effexor/Zoloft. Benzodiazepines, however, cause dependence. The clear implication is that it will be easy to stop taking these SSRIs.
These claims are being made even though withdrawal problems from Paxil were so clearly recognised in the mid-1990s that Lilly could run symposia on the issue and run adverts telling clinicians Prozac is less likely to cause withdrawal problems than Zoloft or Paxil. These claims are being made even though the rates at which withdrawal from and dependence on Paxil and related drugs have been reported to regulators and other bodies worldwide greatly exceed the rates for reporting for either withdrawal from or dependence on either benzodiazepines or indeed therapeutically used opioids (Medawar 1997; Medawar et al 2003) antidepressants deflected concerns about their dependence producing potential, which now seems as great as anything associated with earlier drugs.
As of 1990, it was relatively clear that a post-SSRI generation of psychotropic drugs would be targeted at anxiety, and sold as anxiolytics. This simple switch of terminology -from tranquilliser to anxiolytic -was all it would take to allay the concerns of the public regarding the risks of dependence. No one would make the connection to Valium, Librium and Ativan even though these drugs were also anxiolytics. However, companies have been slow at bringing the next generation of drugs out and hence have needed to rebrand the SSRIs as anxiolytic antidepressants. In 1990, the SSRIs became antidepressants because it was thought unlikely that branding them as anxiolytics would work with academic psychiatrists. In 2002, it is clear that marketing departments have decided that rebranding SSRI drugs as anxiolytics, and avoiding use of the term tranquilliser, is all it takes to bring academic psychiatry onside.
This development offers some measure of the degree of control pharmaceutical company marketers now have over the consciousness of a profession. This article has attempted to outline some of the mechanisms by which this control is achieved. These involve a set of relatively new departures within marketing, such that companies now sell diseases rather than just drugs. To do this, where they used celebrity endorsement before, they turn to celebrity academics now.
Where articles were placed in the lay media by PR companies before, academic articles are now increasingly written by medical writing agencies and placed in the leading journals in the field. Where company products were previously judged on the basis of independent research, and research publications were distributed by companies if they coincided with company interests, companies now design, and conduct their own studies, for indications that suit their commercial interests. Clinicians meanwhile continue to believe they are not unduly influenced by pharmaceutical companies. 
